The vector b is assumed to be fixed. Consider the vector of quantities x = (xI, . . . , xM) where xm is the demand at Am, satisfying the condition Zm= 1m < EN= l bn, and let F(x, .. ., xM) be the minimal cost of x. Formally F(xi,..., . . , ) = It is easy to verify that the optimal solution is obtained by transporting 20 units from B2 to A1 with associated cost of 20 * 1000 = 20,000, and by transporting 20 units from B1 to A2 with costs 20 15 = 300. However, destination A1 should not be allocated 20,000 out of the total cost of 20,300. The above solution turns to be optimal since the penalty paid, once A2 is not supplied from its cheapest origin, is much higher than the penalty paid in case A, is not supplied from its cheapest origin. Therefore A 1 should be supplied from the more expensive origin for him, namely from B2, in order to achieve the minimal cost. Hence it seems that the destination A2 subsidizes destination A . But this cannot be a reason to charge Al a price higher than A2. On the contrary, since from each of the origins transportation to A 1 is cheaper than to A2 it is expected that the price per unit charged at A, should be less than the one charged at A2.
It should be mentioned that shadow prices are not applicable in our study since we are interested in cost sharing prices. Because the cost function F(xl, . ... , xM) in our problem is convex, the shadow prices yield a profit. For instance, in the above example the shadow prices are 1000 and 1005 for A1 and A2, respectively. Thus, the total revenue under these prices is 20 * 1000 + 20 * 1005 = 40,100 and the profit is 40,100 -20,300 = 19,800. Shadow prices are cost sharing prices for any x = (xt, . .. ., X) if and only if F is homogeneous of degree 1. This happens, for example, when resources at the origins are unlimited and then each destination is totally supplied by its cheapest origin. In these cases A-S prices and shadow prices coincide (see ?3). is a cost function satisfying F(0) = 0. The variables xm denote nonnegative quantities of the commodities produced. Let a = (a,, . .. , aM) be a vector of these commodities. Suppose that the commodities are various types of corn, and they are piled together into one heap. Identify this heap with a continuum of players and associate with it a cooperative game va defined as follows: For each subset S of the heap let va(S) be the cost of producing S. The Aumann-Shapley value for this nonatomic game is a measure defined on the space of players (the heap) which assigns to each coalition its contribution to the total cost of the heap, i.e., to the cost of producing a. The A-S price of the mth commodity is the value of a unit of this commodity, i.e., the contribution of this unit to the total cost. The existence of a value for the game v, described above is guaranteed whenever va belongs to a well-known class of games called pNAD. which is defined to be the price of the mth commodity. The components of the vector P(F, a) = (P (F, a) , . . .., PM(F, a)), are the Aumann-Shapley prices. Corollary 5 below guarantees that any game va derived from a TP cost function is in pNAD and therefore A-S prices are applicable for this class of functions. For an intuitive interpretation of the A-S prices, assume that the vector a is produced in an homogeneous way, starting from 0 and ending at a. Suppose also that along the above production process each time a "small" proportion (an "infinitesimal" one) of a is produced, the mth commodity is charged its current marginal production cost. Then the average cost per unit of the mth commodity once a has been produced will be its A-S price. A different derivation of A-S prices is introduced and discussed in [6], [8] and [13] . It has been shown in these works that A-S prices are uniquely determined by a set of neutral, and in a sense equitable, axioms imposed on price mechanisms. Rather than using game theoretic notions, these axioms are stated in purely economic terms, hence providing an economic justification for using the A-S prices. However, the above papers deal only with continuously differentiable cost functions and obviously, in general, TP cost functions are not of that type. In this section we prove that the above mentioned axioms uniquely determine A-S prices on some natural classes of cost functions that include the TP cost functions.
Let y be a family of functions F, such that each F in iY is defined, for some M, on a full dimensional comprehensive subset, CF of EM (i.e., a E CF implies C_ c CF where C= (x E EM I x < a)). By a price mechanism on y we mean a function P(., PROOF. Observe that if the cost function F has a kink at x then the optimal solution must be degenerate. This follows since, in case the solution to WDP at x is nondegenerate, then, in a neighborhood of x, the same basis remains optimal. Hence F is linear in this neighborhood. To prove the theorem, we derive expressions for the basic variables Ynm in terms of x, and show that degeneracy implies that x lies in one of a finite number of hyperplanes of the form given in (1). Assume now that the optimal solution is degenerate at x and consider a maximal connected subgraph of the basic graph which contains one of the arcs that corresponds to a vanishing basic variable. Let us denote by P the set of nodes contained in the unique loop of this subgraph, the existence of which is implied by Lemma 2. To calculate the values of the basic variables, consider first all chains of this subgraph beginning with nodes having exactly one arc and containing exactly one node of P (necessarily the last one in the chain). In case no such chain exists then we proceed to calculate the variables in P as described below.
In each of the above chains, a node n e X-I must be followed by a node m eand vice versa. Thus, it is easy to verify that for the arcs joining these nodes we must have THEOREM 6. For each of the spaces X11, y2, and 13 there exists one and only one price mechanism P(.,. ) which obeys the five axioms. This is the A-S price mechanism, i.e., for each F E YM (i = 1,2, 3) and a E CF, a > 0, Pm(F, a) a (ta)dt, m= 1l,..., M.
We shall first outline the proof of this theorem. It is easy to verify that the A-S formula indeed defines a price mechanism which obeys the five axioms on each of the three sets -1, -2, and -3. As for the uniqueness part, denote by j,M (i = 1,2,3 
Thus it is easy to verify that g is a c.d. function on C. Moreover if the derivative gm exists on (1 -qt)x + qC, then (g*)m(x) = (1 -)(gm)*(X). (14)
The diameter of IqC, is 7l|a|ll < 8 and the diameter of (1 -')x + 7qC~ is the same. Hence, for each x E Ca\HH there is a neighborhood of (1 -71)x + /qC~ which is contained in C,\H. On this neighborhood F coincides with Fk for some k, 1 < k < r. Thus replacing g by F and C by C, we have, by ( 
Hence the two sequences (fn)n_i and (gn)nlI obey the four requirements (4), (5), (6) and (7). Thus to complete the proof of the lemma it is left to prove that these two sequences can be replaced by polynomials which still obey the above four requirements. But this follows from the fact that the polynomials in M variables are dense in the set of all continuously differentiable functions on C F with the norm 11 * Ila for each a E CF (see [13] ). We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 6. PROOF OF THEOREM 6. As was already mentioned it is easy to verify that the A-S formula indeed defines a price mechanism which obeys the five axioms on each of the sets J-1, 2, and Y3. For the uniqueness part let Q(-, ) be a price mechanism which obeys the five axioms on Yj for some i (i = 1,2,3). By Lemma 11 Q(-,.) can be extended to a price mechanism on J which obeys the five axioms. Now since , contains the polynomials and since on PO the A-S price mechanism is the only price mechanism that obeys the five axioms (see ., x, 0 ,...*, 0), i.e., he receives commodities only at his destination.
(3) Note that one can redefine F by replacing the TP cost functions by similar WDP cost functions and still retain all the properties needed for the existence of an equilibrium.
5. An algorithm for computing A-S prices for TP cost functions. In this section we refer to an algorithm which evaluates the A-S prices for a given TP and feasible vector a = (a1, . . ., aM). The algorithm can also be used to solve the associated TP problem for x = a. Consequently, to compute the A-S prices vector there is no need to solve TP separately in order to obtain the transportation plan.
Since F is piecewise linear, by Corollary 4 we have that the A-S price vector P(F, a) is a finite sum of the gradients of the linear "pieces" of F along the line segment [0, a], where each of these is weighted by the normalized length of the sub-interval in which F has a constant gradient. Consequently it is sufficient to consider F(ta) for 0 < t < 1 and find the values t , j = 0, .. ., J, where to? = 0, tJ = 1, for which F(ta) changes gradient. The algorithm which computes the points ti, the fixed gradient of F in each interval (tia, ti+ 'a) and solves the TP at a is described in detail in [ 
